The first thing one must realize when entering major inter-state negotiations is that, contrary to popular belief, the actual negotiation process is little more than formality. Each side has already mapped out exactly where they want negotiations to go, and the presentation of such plans is what face-to-face negotiations are all about. Actual policy cannot be decided at the negotiation table, but rather is debated after the proceedings, among the two sides in seclusion. They take the incentives presented by the opposing side and re-consider their offer, and report back with a new set of directives. For this reason, such negotiations take a great deal of time, and often fall short of their expectations. For one side to successfully achieve its ends, difficult concessions must often be made, and such positions are much less likely to be adopted by policymakers when they aren’t sitting directly across from the people demanding them.
This isn’t to say, however, that the actual negotiation process isn’t important. Rather, success or failure in the overall process rests largely on how one is able to conduct oneself in the debate. It becomes much easier to demand more of one’s opponent when one obtains a verbal victory in confrontation. To achieve this with a state like Iran, a number of cultural points must be considered.
As a starter, Persian culture experts should be consulted on all starting matters. This could include greetings, appearance, timeliness, location, date, proper topics of conversation, and a number of other criteria. Using the wrong greeting, wearing distasteful clothes, or holding negotiations on a religious holiday could automatically put the negotiator at a disadvantage, on the mere assumption that they haven’t done their research or can’t relate to the Persian mindset.
More important than face-value cultural inroads, however, are basic perspective disparities. In the United States’ eyes, most of the world’s nuclear weapons are in the hands of reliable countries. The U.S., the U.K., and France are all friendly and civil powers, and the Russians and the Chinese know better than to deploy nuclear weapons to solve conflicts. India and Israel are responsible states, even though they developed their nuclear weapons covertly, and Pakistan should be able to keep its weapons out of radical hands as long as the military is well-supplied. But in the eyes of the west, Iran is a rogue state. They live under a radical theocratic regime, and have stated their intention to destroy the state of Israel by any means possible. They are known to supply weapons to extremists in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and beyond, and the prospect of such a state with nuclear technology is unacceptable. But in the Iranian government’s eyes, the world exists almost in reverse: the present nuclear-weapons states are rogue, and act to oppress the third world, particularly Iran, for the purpose of power and profit. Dispelling such a notion through negotiations is impossible; working through it is difficult, and will require a major reworking of rhetoric in order to bridge perspective-based gaps.
However, just because one is heavily reworking their presentation to accommodate the Iranians doesn’t mean they should expect the same in return. In fact, it’s very likely that the Iranian negotiators will launch into major criticisms of the West, and of the U.S. in particular. They will probably bring up a litany of charges against the United States, ranging from the overthrow of the Mossadegh government to the support of the Shah to the propping up of Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War. Iran’s list of grievances against the West goes on and on, and it’s important to make sure that one’s conduct in the face of these criticisms does not allow them to be made into bargaining points. One should not, in an attempt to bridge the cultural divide, agree with the charges being levelled, or attempt to apologize for past transgressions. Capitulation in the face of historical events will undermine the case being made presently. However, when facing charges from the Iranians, one should also avoid defending against them. Do not attempt to change their views on history at the present time, and certainly do not criticize the Iranian state. Circumventing all of recent history will help ground negotiations in the here and now, and will deal them one less card to play with.
If a speech is to be given at the negotiations, I would suggest that it be written first in Farsi, by a native Farsi speaker. It should then be translated back to English to be read publicly, but the original text should be kept as the official translation. The readability of the speech in English is unimportant, since its target audience speaks Farsi. It would help to have an eloquent Farsi speech to give, not one that displays the clear linguistic shortcomings of a foreigner.
Be aware: For all the cultural and linguistic considerations, as well as the Iranians’ dramatic flair, there are still strategic interests at stake. Despite all the helpful suggestions on how not to offend the other side, there remain goals that need to be accomplished, and Iran will want more-than-appropriate quid pro quo in exchange for abandoning their nuclear designs. Keep in mind what the Iranian government wants. First and foremost, they want a guarantee that they will remain in power. For them, the worst-case scenario is a revolution leading to their overthrow, and any legitimacy they can derive from direct negotiations with the United States helps them propagate their image as the sole political representatives of Iran. If absolutely necessary, open the prospect of establishing official diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic, including setting up embassies in each others’ countries. After legitimacy, the Iranian government seeks regional power, especially in the Fertile Crescent region. Leave Iraq on the table to discuss, since they seek influence on the Shi’a majority there.
Most importantly, as with any negotiations, try to make as few concessions as possible while obtaining your goal, that being nuclear disarmament. The greatest good all of the formal elements can do it to set one off on strong footing for the remainder of the debate. To obtain extra concessions from them, mention, in a respectful but strategic manner, the election turmoil that occurred recently. Without appearing too haughty or conceited, make it seem as though they’re on much less stable footing than they make themselves out to be, and offer some help in recognizing and legitimizing the current regime.
To make progress with talks on Iran’s nuclear capability, bridging cultural discrepancies is necessary for any negotiator. However, backing up such diplomacy with solid political bait is the only way to obtain final resolution to the situation.
Perry Landesberg
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